INFORMATION SERVICE

Published Weekly, Except During August, by the

DEPARTMENT OF RESEARCH AND EDUCATION
FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA
105 EAST 22ND STREET, NEW YORK. N. Y.

Price, $2.00 Per Year **Volume VII, Number 45**

The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America is a federation of twenty-eight national religious bodies through which they are rendering united service. Articles appearing herein furnish information on current issues and are not to be construed as declarations of official attitudes or policies of the Federal Council of Churches.

Entered as second class matter January 4, 1924, at the postoffice at New York, New York, under act of March 3, 1879.

The Proposed Increase in the Navy

It will be recalled that the first bill to increase the Navy, which was introduced in the last session of Congress, called for a five-year construction program to include twenty-five 10,000-ton cruisers, 32 large submarines, 9 large destroyers, 5 large airplane carriers, at a total cost roughly estimated at $740,000,000. The House Committee on Naval Affairs dropped from this bill the provision that the President would be authorized to suspend all or part of this construction in case of an international conference for the further limitation of armaments. Public opinion was so strongly opposed to the bill, however, that it was soon withdrawn and H. R. 11526 was substituted for it. This bill was passed by the House of Representatives at the last session and awaits Senate action during the present session. The new bill calls for the laying down of 15 light cruisers and one aircraft carrier before July 1, 1931. Five cruisers are to be laid down during each of the fiscal years ending June 30, 1929, 1930, and 1931, to cost not more than $17,000,000 each. The aircraft carrier would be laid down before June 30, 1930, and would cost not more than $19,000,000. The total cost would be about $274,000,000. The bill provides that the first "and each succeeding alternate cruiser," the engines, armament, etc., should be built in government navy yards and arsenals unless the Secretary of the Navy should find that certain material could be procured "by contract or purchase at an appreciable saving in cost to the government." The construction of these ships would be subject to the limitations prescribed by the Washington Conference. The President would be empowered to suspend all or part of the naval construction authorized by this Act if an international agreement to limit naval armaments should be reached, to which the United States shall be signatory. The President is requested in the bill to encourage such an agreement.

There has been some discussion as to whether the phrase "international agreement" refers to a treaty which would have to be ratified by the Senate before the President could act to halt the building program, or whether the President could act as soon as an agreement were signed. The term "international agreement" is not usually used of a pact that requires Senate ratification, but the bill at present is not explicit in that respect.

The following tables which show the comparative strength of the British and American navies are reprinted by courtesy of the Foreign Policy Association from their *Information Service* for November 23.

RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND BRITISH NAVY BASED ON DATA FURNISHED BY THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT—INFORMATION AS OF OCTOBER 1, 1927, AND AUGUST 1, 1928

Table 1—First-Line Cruisers, All Sizes (3,000 to 10,000 Tons, 27 Knots Plus)

	BUILT		*BUILDING*		*APP'R. FOR*		*TOTAL*	
Country	*Number*	*Tons*	*Number*	*Tons*	*Number*	*Tons*	*Number*	*Tons*
United States	10	75,000	8	80,000	0	None	18	155,000
British Empire	46	260,810	8	76,000	2	18,000[1]	56	354,810

[1] Great Britain has announced that these two ships will not be laid down this year as originally planned. Three more cruisers (one 10,000 tons, two 8,000 tons) were projected in the Five-Year Birkenhead program adopted in 1925. They have not been appropriated for, and the British government has not announced when they will be built.

Comparative Strength in Large First-Line Cruisers, 7,500 to 10,000 Tons, Built and Building

Country	*Number*	*Tons*
United States	18	155,000
British Empire	21	200,100

Comparative Strength in Large First-Line Cruisers, 7,500 to 10,000 Tons in 1931 if the 15 United States Cruisers Requested in H. R. 11526 Are Built and the Present British Program Is Carried Out

Country	*Number*	*Tons*
United States	33	305,000
British Empire	26	244,100

Comparative Strength in First-Line Cruisers, All Sizes, in 1931 (3,000 to 10,000 Tons, 27 Knots Plus) if the 15 U. S. Cruisers Requested in H. R. 11526 Are Built and the Present British Program Is Carried Out

Country	*Number*	*Tons*
United States	33	305,000
British Empire	59	380,810

CRUISER TYPES

CL Light Cruisers, First Line (5-8-Inch Guns; 3,000 to 10,000 Tons; 27 Knots Plus)

UNITED STATES

Name	Laid down	Completed	Displ. (long tons)	Speed	Battery: Main	Battery: Anti-aircraft	Battery: Torpedo tubes
Built:							
1. Omaha	1918	1923	7,500	34.9	12.6"	4.3"	6
2. Milwaukee	1918	1923	7,500	34.6	12.6"	4.3"	6
3. Cincinnati	1920	1923	7,500	34.4	12.6"	4.3"	6
4. Raleigh	1920	1924	7,500	34.6	12.6"	4.3"	6
5. Detroit	1920	1923	7,500	34.6	12.6"	4.3"	6
6. Richmond	1920	1923	7,500	34.2	12.6"	4.3"	6
7. Concord	1920	1923	7,500	33.5	12.6"	4.3"	6
8. Trenton	1920	1924	7,500	33.7	12.6"	4.3"	6
9. Marblehead	1920	1924	7,500	33.7	12.6"	4.3"	6
10. Memphis	1920	1925	7,500	33.7	12.6"	4.3"	6
Total (10)			75,000				
Building:							
11. Pensacola	1926	50%	10,000	32.5	10.8"	4.5"	6
12. Salt Lake City	1927	60%	10,000	32.5	10.8"	4.5"	6
13. Chester		28%	10,000	32.7	9.8"	4.5"	6
14. C. C. No. 26		28%	10,000	32.7	9.8"	4.5"	6
15. Augusta		17%	10,000	32.7	9.8"	4.5"	6
16. C. C. No. 28		12%	10,000	32.7	9.8"	4.5"	6
17. Chicago		7%	10,000	32.7	9.8"	4.5"	6
18. Houston		29%	10,000	32.7	9.8"	4.5"	6
Total (8)			80,000				
Grand total (18)			155,000				

BRITISH EMPIRE

Name	Laid down	Completed	Displ. (long tons)	Speed	Battery: Main	Battery: Anti-aircraft	Battery: Torpedo tubes
Built:							
1. Comus	1913	1915	3,750	29	4.6"	2.3"	4
2. Conquest	1914	1915	3,750	29	3.6"	2.3"	4
3. Carysfort	1914	1915	3,750	29	4.6"	2.3"	4
4. Cleopatra	1914	1915	3,750	29	4.6"	2.3"	4
5. Calliope	1914	1915	3,750	29	4.6"	2.3"	2
6. Champion	1914	1915	3,750	29	4.6"	1.3"	6
7. Castor	1914	1915	3,750	29	4.6"	2.3"	2
8. Cambrian	1914	1916	3,750	29	4.6"	2.3"	2
9. Canterbury	1914	1916	3,750	29	4.6"	2.3"	2
10. Constance	1915	1916	3,750	29	4.6"	2.3"	2
11. Centaur	1915	1916	3,750	29	4.6"	2.3"	2
12. Concord	1915	1916	3,750	29	5.6"	2.3"	2
13. Caradoc	1916	1917	4,120	29	5.6"	2.3"	8
14. Calypso	1916	1917	4,120	29	5.6"	2.3"	8
15. Caledon	1916	1917	4,120	29	5.6"	2.3"	8
16. Cardiff	1916	1917	4,190	29	5.6"	2.3"	8
17. Coventry	1916	1918	4,190	29	5.6"	2.3"	8
18. Curlew	1916	1917	4,190	29	5.6"	2.3"	8
19. Ceres	1916	1917	4,190	29	5.6"	2.3"	8
20. Curacoa	1916	1918	4,190	29	5.6"	2.3"	8
21. Danae	1916	1918	4,650	29	6.6"	3.4"	12
22. Frobisher	1916	1924	9,750	30.5	7·7.5"	3.4"	6
23. Hawkins	1916	1919	9,750	30	7·7.5"	4.4"	6
24. Vindictive	1916	1918	9,750	30	6·7.5"	3.4"	6
25. Cairo	1917	1919	4,190	29	5.6"	2.3"	8
26. Calcutta	1917	1919	4,190	29	5.6"	2.3"	8
27. Carlisle	1917	1918	4,190	29	5.6"	2.3"	8
28. Colombo	1917	1919	4,190	29	5.6"	2.3"	8
29. Effingham	1917	1925	9,770	30.5	7·7.5"	3.4"	5
30. Dauntless	1917	1918	4,650	29	6.6"	3.4"	12
31. Dragon	1917	1918	4,650	29	6.6"	3.4"	12
32. Dunedin	1917	1919	4,650	29	6.6"	3.4"	12
33. Delhi	1917	1919	4,650	29	6.6"	3.4"	12
34. Despatch	1918	1922	4,765	29	6.6"	3.4"	12
35. Durban	1918	1921	4,650	29	6.6"	3.4"	12
36. Diomede	1918	1922	4,765	29	6.6"	3.4"	12
37. Capetown	1918	1922	4,190	29	5.6"	2.3"	8
38. Emerald	1918	1926	7,550	33	7.6"	3.4"	12
39. Enterprise	1918	1926	7,550	33	7.6"	3.4"	12
40. Kent	1924	1928	10,000	31.5	8.8"	4.4"	8
41. Cornwall	1924	1928	10,000	31.5	8.8"	4.4"	8
42. Cumberland	1924	1928	10,000	31.5	8.8"	4.4"	8
43. Suffolk	1924	1928	10,000	31.5	8.8"	4.4"	8
44. Berwick	1924	1928	10,000	31.5	8.8"	4.4"	8
45. Australia (A)	1925	1928	10,000	31.5	8.8"	4.4"	8
46. Canberra (A)	1925	1928	10,000	31.5	8.8"	4.4"	8
Total (46)			260,810				
Building:							
47. London	1926		10,000	33	8.8"	4.4"	12
48. Devonshire	1926		10,000	33	8.8"	4.4"	12
49. Shropshire	1927		10,000	33	8.8"	4.4"	12
50. Sussex	1927		10,000	33	8.8"	4.4"	12
51. Dorsetshire	1927		10,000	—	——	——	—
52. Norfolk	1927		10,000	—	——	——	—
53. York	1927		8,000	—	——	——	—
54. Essex	1928		8,000	—	——	——	—
Total (8)			76,000				
Appropriated for:							
55.			10,000				
56.			8,000				
Total (2)[1]			18,000				
Grand total (56)			354,810				

[1] Two totaling 18,000 tons will *not* be laid down this year.
(A) Built for Australia.



Thus the program specified in the Navy bill (H. R. 11526) will give the United States advantage in one category; on the other hand, it will leave Britain superior in both number and tonnage in all first-line cruisers. It should be noted, however, that many of these British cruisers are small and very old.

* * *

It will be recalled that at the three-power naval conference in Geneva the English and American representatives could not agree on the question whether limitation should be reached by "global tonnage" or by categories. (See INFORMATION SERVICE for April 14, 1928, for a fuller discussion of the question from the British viewpoint). At the Geneva Conference the British delegation argued that there were two categories of cruisers—the big 10,000-ton 8-inch gun cruisers for use in battle and the smaller 6,000-ton 6-inch gun cruisers for the protection of coasts and trade routes. The British delegation urged that each category should be limited as to tonnage and gun power or that the number of large ships should be limited and the rest of the tonnage used for 6,000-ton cruisers. The American delegation argued for the limitation of total (or global) tonnage, with the right to build any type of cruiser within that limit. Great Britain considers that it needs many relatively small vessels to protect its long trade routes, and that these smaller vessels are of very little use against large cruisers. The American delegation, on the other hand, argued that on the British plan the United States would be forbidden to build the ships she most needed and that since the United States has but few naval bases, these smaller ships would be of very little use.

How Much Coal Is Enough?

In an attempt to answer the question "How Much Coal Is Enough?" in the *Atlantic Monthly*, December, 1928, George J. Anderson, president of the Consolidation Coal Company, paints a vivid picture of the problems of production, distribution and consumption in a basic industry. Admittedly, there are too many mines and too many miners, for the present productive capacity is able to supply twice the amount that consumers demand. But if a dictator were appointed to coordinate supply and demand he would not only have to deal with a surplus of mines and miners but with the habits of consumers. Statistics show both a seasonal and a cyclical variation in consumption. In April, 1923, and November, 1926, there was a demand for from 60 to 67 per cent greater daily production than in the same months in 1921, while there is a seasonal variation of from 30 to 50 per cent within calendar years. From July, 1926, to June, 1927, coal production was over 107,000,000 tons greater than in the same period of 1927-1928. These variations require a reserve army of miners and a surplus of mines.

Although consumers are chiefly responsible for these variations, the problem of regularizing production and consumption is complex. It is difficult to store bituminous coal because of a fluctuating market, danger of spontaneous combustion, and expense and loss from handling. Coal varies greatly in sizes and seasonal demands, for different sizes do not always coincide.

A dictator would not only have to deal with these factors, but he would have to adjust wages which frequently are two-thirds or more of the cost. There is great variation in wage rates and in earnings per day, per week and per year as affected by mining conditions and opportunity to work. If consumers demand a reserve army of 150,000 miners to supply coal when they want it, the miners likewise demand enough to live on during the year. Thus if the dictator were conducting the industry merely on a self-sustaining basis he would have to fix prices which would enable him to deal with variable conditions both in production and consumption.

"During the war we had a semi-dictatorship in the Fuel Administration. Ten years ago, after an examination of hundreds of mine costs, with due regard to the consumer, it fixed prices at something like an average of eighty cents a ton above present rates. Consider what has happened to many items of expense since that time. Consider the cost of coal as our dictator has just computed it, in his efforts to 'work justice to the miners, consumers and producers.' For so runs also the gospel according to the Republicans. Consider, in brief, the unhappy dilemma of our dictatorial friend. Either he will conduct his enterprise with $400,000,000 less than his forerunner considered equitable in the light of conditions now ten years past, or he will announce the unwelcome news that the consumers must contribute that much more, at least, than they now pay under the present 'disordered public service.' . . .

"Finding coal in chaos, priest and Levite have passed by on the other side; what it needs is the understanding of the good Samaritan.

"For the rest, I believe the industry must look largely

to self-help. It is my own opinion that the keys to the quickest, though not to the most complete, relief are in its own hands. Closer cooperation between districts, mergers of existing properties, a new attitude of mind—these can all be vital elements in the cure of the industry. And the greatest of these is a new attitude of mind. Better means of cooperation may involve a long process of education in an enterprise noted, even notorious, for its individualism. Mergers, especially in the ownerships of natural resources, require difficult appraisals and prolonged negotiation. But for a new attitude of mind all a normal man should need is a few frank hours with himself."

Some time ago the Consolidation Coal Company announced a policy (See INFORMATION SERVICE June 9, 1928) of reducing the number of mines and the number of workers. Other companies have regarded this policy favorably, but it is questionable how far coordination of production and consumption can be effected by this means without dealing with other factors which enter into the situation.

Obviously, says Mr. Anderson, "coal is the lifeblood of industry" and "we in the coal industry are not merely capital and labor." So "when next our troubles burst upon you beneath a barrage of headlines, as they often have and as they sometimes will, do not think of us merely as 'too many mines and too many miners.' Try to envisage us as human beings, perhaps with too many burdens, but surely not with too many friends."

The Sacco-Vanzetti Case Again

It will be remembered that Vanzetti had been convicted of participating in an attempted hold-up at Bridgewater, Mass., before the trial for the South Braintree murder for which Sacco and Vanzetti were finally executed. Sacco was able to prove he was elsewhere on December 24, 1919, and therefore was not tried for that case. Vanzetti's alibi was that he was delivering eels in Plymouth, where he lived. A number of witnesses declared at the trial that they had purchased eels from him that day. Documentary evidence, however, was lacking, and his witnesses were discredited for one reason or another. It is an Italian custom to eat eels at Christmas-time, but the judge and jury saw no reason why so many Italians should be buying eels.

The *Outlook and Independent* has made an investigation of this case at the suggestion of Silas Bent. The results of this investigation, as published in the *Outlook and Independent* for October 31, indicate that Vanzetti was innocent of that crime. Jack Callahan, a reformed bank burglar, who had been assured by his underworld friends that Sacco and Vanzetti had "been given the works," undertook to discover who had committed the Bridgewater crime. (It would have been difficult, if not impossible, for a person unfamiliar with the underworld to have made the study.) He explains his belief that the Bridgewater and South Braintree crimes could not have been done by the same persons. The Bridgewater case, which was a failure, was badly planned. But the South Braintree murder was skilfully planned and carried out successfully. Various details, however, convinced Mr. Callahan that both the Bridgewater and South Braintree crimes were done by professional criminals. The fact that only Sacco and Vanzetti were captured, though it was known that four or five men were involved, "imp[illegible] but one thing to the man who knows detectives and his underworld. . . . When they got the two Italian radicals they got the wrong men." Mr. Callahan finally located "Big Chief" Mede, in whose cigar store the Bridgewater crime was originally planned, and Frank Silva, who confessed that he had taken part in it and declared that Vanzetti had not. Silva's affidavit giving the details of the Bridgewater crime is printed in the *Outlook* with a number of questions asked him by Mr. Callahan and the replies.

It might perhaps be assumed that this confession was prompted by a desire to secure the money paid by the *Outlook*. But Silva was not paid until the story had been carefully checked with the evidence given at the trial and with the reports made by the detectives who first investigated the Bridgewater crime. Silva and Mede took Silas Bent and Mr. Callahan to Bridgewater and rehearsed the crime for them again. It is interesting to note that, in several respects, Silva's story checked accurately with conditions in Bridgewater, which have changed since 1919. The car tracks, for instance, on the street where the attempted hold-up took place have been removed since then. Mr. Bent states that the slight discrepancies in Silva's confession are insignificant in comparison with Silva's detailed knowledge of the happenings that day. Since the Bridgewater case did not attract much attention in the newspapers either at the time or in the later discussions of the Sacco-Vanzetti case, Mr. Bent considers that if Silva had not taken part in it, "he could not conceivably have such detailed, provable knowledge of it."

Another important point in the evidence is the discovery of the American Express Company's receipt for a forty-pound barrel of live eels, shipped to Vanzetti at Plymouth on December 20, 1919. This receipt was given to Governor Fuller's personal attorney with an explanation of its significance. But neither Governor Fuller nor the Lowell committee made any reference to it. Mede told his story to Governor Fuller on July 12 and later offered to tell it to Captain Blye of the Massachusetts State Police who, it is alleged, refused to hear it.

The *Outlook* for November 7 prints an interview with William G. Thompson, chief of counsel in the Sacco-Vanzetti case. Mr. Thompson took practically no part in the *Outlook's* investigation and had not read the articles published later. He states his belief that Vanzetti had nothing to do with the Bridgewater case, and that Mede's story was "substantially correct."

Book Note

BRITAIN'S INDUSTRIAL FUTURE. A Report of the Liberal Industrial Inquiry. London, Ernest Benn Limited, 1928.

This report was fully treated in INFORMATION SERVICE for March 10 under the title "Liberal Party Industrial Inquiry." An American edition is published by the *New Republic*, 421 West 21st Street, New York. $1.00.

Printed in U. S. A.